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I. INTRODUCTION
The American public has long viewed the legal profession with a
puzzling mixture of respect and envy tempered by distaste and mis-
trust.' Nevertheless, Americans especially are amenable to invoking ju-
dicial processes when a wrong is perceived.' This tendency has led to
the well-publicized problems of overcrowded dockets and lengthy trial
1. Public opinion of attorneys and levels of confidence in attorneys have declined sharply in
recent years. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.BA J., Apr. 1984, at 62 (annual report presented
during the mid-year meeting of the American Bar Association).
2. Partridge, Wilkinson & Krouse, A Complaint Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous
Litigation, 31 Loy. L. REv. 221, 227 (1985).
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proceedings,3 both of which contribute to making the American legal
system the most expensive in the world.4 Commentators,5 the legal com-
munity,6 and other citizens increasingly criticize the litigiousness of the
American legal system.7
The legal profession generally is exempt from governmental regula-
tion because the bar adopts and enforces its own internal standards.'
These standards, which attempt to instill in the bar a sense of ethics
and proper moral conduct,9 appear in the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility'° (the Code) and the more recent Model Rules of Profes-
3. Id. at 228-32.
4. Burger, supra note 1, at 63. The number of lawyers in the United States has increased
more than 50% since 1960. Bok, Law and Its Discontents: A Critical Look at Our Legal System, 8
B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 21. The United States has the largest per capita ratio of attorneys in
the world. Id. at 21-22.
5. See Franaszek, Justice and the Reduction of Litigation Cost: A Different Perspective, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 337 (1985). Franaszek discusses the relationship between justice for all people and
the excessive costs of litigation. Society's concern with the increasing costs of litigation is based on
"more than an interest in efficiency or court administration. This focus on expense is prompted by
a fundamental fear that litigation cost hinders the legal system's capacity to deliver justice ...
[T]he high cost of litigating may systematically preclude various parties from resolving their differ-
ences." Id. at 337.
6. Burger, supra note 1, at 62.
7. Id. at 65-66. Chief Justice Burger stated:
The entire legal profession-lawyers, judges, law teachers-has become so mesmerized with
the stimulation of the courtroom contest that we tend to forget that we ought to be heal-
ers-healers of conflicts. Doctors, in spite of astronomical medical costs, still retain a high
degree of public confidence because they are perceived as healers. Should lawyers not be heal-
ers? Healers, not warriors? Healers, not procurers? Healers, not hired guns?
Id. at 66; see also Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia,
100 F.R.D. 109, 207-12 (1983) [hereinafter Judicial Conference] (message of Chief Justice Warren
Burger); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 7
(1983) (observing that Americans are the most litigious and contentious society in the world).
8. Cooper, Opening Statement, 12 LITIGATION, Spring 1986, at 1.
9. For a discussion of human decency and moral obligations in the legal profession, see
Freedman, Lawyer and Client: Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, in ETHICS AND
ADvoCAcy: FINAL REPoRT, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE 45 (1978). Professor
Freedman discusses the growing fear in the legal community that a truly "professional" lawyer
cannot also show human decency, and that the concepts of a "good lawyer" and a "good person"
are incompatible. Id. at 45.
10. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The
preamble provides:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the
concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the
individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-government. . ..
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society.. .. A
consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standard of ethical conduct.
[I]n the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of
his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive
for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of the respect and confi-
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sional Conduct (the Rules)." The Code and the Rules both stress the
high standards of integrity and competence that attorneys owe to their
clients and to the public in general. 12 The Code and the Rules also re-
quire attorneys to enforce the standards by reporting any violations by
their colleagues.' 3 Moreover, the Code requires attorneys to exhibit re-
spect for the law by at all times "refrain[ing] from all illegal and mor-
ally reprehensible conduct."' 4 Despite these ethical criteria, many
commentators perceive the legal profession as amoral, or even im-
moral. 5 Attorneys typically attempt to justify overzealous, far-reaching
behavior as a manifestation of the lawyer's duty diligently to represent
his client 6 and as an important factor in the adversary system. 7 This
duty compels the lawyer to do "all that the laws or the Constitution
allows."" s Perhaps the most unusual and beneficial attribute of the
American attorney is his devotion to and zeal in representing his cli-
ent.19 This same broad allegiance, however, has contributed to society's
low esteem for the legal process and to the need for external regulation
of lawyers.2 °
dence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the
law will continue to be a noble profession.
MODEL CODE, supra, preamble.
11. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association on August 2, 1983. As of July 1987 the Model Rules were in effect in
various form in 24 states-Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
The preamble of the Model Rules provides:
A lawyer is a representative of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibil-
ity for the quality of justice.
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations
and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system.
* * ' A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to
harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for
those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
12. MODEL CODE, supra note 10, EC 1-1, EC 1-2; MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 1.1.
13. MODEL CODE, supra note 10, EC 1-4; MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 8.3.
14. MODEL CODE, supra note 10, EC 1-5.
15. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 9, at 47.
16. MODEL CODE, supra note 10, DR 7-101.
17. Id. at EC 7-19.
18. Burger, supra note 1, at 63.
19. Rifkind, Professionalism Under Siege: A Call to Combat Commercialism, 11 B. LEADER,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 13, 14.
20. Public perception may be distorted by current legal crises such as the Dalkon Shield,
asbestos, medical malpractice, and the insurance/tort reform controversies. Cooper, supra note 8,
at 56. Individual lawyers must make every effort to allay these concerns. See, e.g., id. The bar is
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This Note analyzes Rule 1121 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as a potentially effective means for regulating attorney abuses of
the legal system. Part II examines the traditional American rule, which
denies recovery of attorney fees and requires each litigant to bear his
own expenses. Part II also discusses the original 1938 version of Federal
Rule 11 and the courts' hesitation to apply it. Part III outlines and ana-
lyzes the substantive revision of Rule 11 in 1983 and traces the practical
application of the amended Rule by the courts. Part IV discusses the
various social and professional concerns that motivate judicial inclina-
tion or reluctance to find violations of Federal Rule 11. Finally, Part V
concludes that the strong deterrent and punitive potential of the Rule
must be utilized in order to create a major change in the typical litiga-
tion process.
committed to regulation by means of sanctions under the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In 1984 the Bar spent more than $30 million for lawyer
discipline in 46 states. Few other professions have as thorough an internal regulatory policy. Sanc-
tions include disbarment, suspension, and public reprimand. See Austern, How Lawyers Police
Themselves, 22 TRIAL, Apr. 1986, at 17; see also Bierig, Whatever Happened to Professional Self-
Regulation?, 8 B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 19; Silas, What Bars Are Doing to Enhance Profes-
sionalism, 11 B. LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 15.
21. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides for the signing of pleadings, motions, and
other papers as well as for sanctions if the rule is violated. It states:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, plead-
ings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments
of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to
the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless
it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If
a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion,
or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983).
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II. PRE-AMENDMENT STANDARDS
A. The American Rule
Federal courts traditionally have recognized the "American rule,"
which prevents a prevailing litigant from recovering attorney's fees.2
The losing party may be assessed "costs," 23 but the term "costs" gener-
ally is defined statutorily to exclude attorney's fees.24 Therefore, each
party, including the exonerated defendant, must pay his own attorney's
fees.25 The United States Supreme Court has refused to abandon the
American rule, which was first upheld judicially in 1796 2 and later con-
gressionally sanctioned.
2 7
The origin of the American rule is not clear. 28 The American rule
differs from the English rule, as well as the rules in most other industri-
alized democracies, which impose attorney's fees on the losing party.29
One suggested explanation for the development of the American rule is
that during the colonial period lawyers quickly liberated themselves
from governmental fee regulation and allowed the free market to deter-
mine their fees.30 This competitive system eliminated the need to rely
on a fee-shifting arrangement. The lawyer-client contract dictated each
22. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
23. "Costs" are a "pecuniary allowance, made to the successful party ... for his expenses in
prosecuting or defending an action.... [and include] [flees and charges required by law to be
paid to the courts or some of their officers. . . e.g. filing and service fees." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 312 (5th ed. 1979).
24. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 757-58.
25. H. COHEN, REPORT ON AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES By FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL
AGENCIES 1 (1985).
26. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); see also Roadway Express, 447
U.S. at 759.
27. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 260-71.
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the "American Rule" with respect to
the allowance of attorneys' fees. It has been criticized. . . . But the rule followed in our courts
with respect to attorneys' fees has survived. It is deeply rooted in our history and in congres-
sional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature's province by redistributing litiga-
tion costs. . ..
Id. at 270-71 (footnotes omitted).
Although Congress has passed numerous fee-shifting statutes in response to Alyeska Pipeline,
the legislators have never abandoned the American rule. The general rule is that each side bears
his own costs of litigation in the absence of a specific carved-out exception. Starr, The Shifting
Panorama of Attorneys' Fees Awards: The Expansion of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28 S.
TEx. L. REV. 189, 195 (1986)
28. For an analysis of various theories on the origin of the American rule, see Starr, supra
note 27, at 189.
29. H. COHEN, supra note 25, at 1.
30. Starr, supra note 27, at 190.
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party's financial obligation." A second explanation is that in the late
eighteenth century the general public greatly distrusted attorneys;
therefore, the American legal system rejected the English rule in order
to quell the fear that attorneys would abuse the fee-shifting system.32 A
third theory explains the rejection of the English rule as simply one
element of the pervasive anti-English sentiment of the colonial period.
33
Regardless of the origin of the American rule, the consensus among
commentators is that the purpose of the American rule is to encourage
litigation. The rule ensures that the plaintiff may bring suit without the
threat of being assessed the defendant's attorney's fees if the action is
unsuccessful.3 4 This unhindered access to the courts also furthers the
American policy of protecting individual rights.35
Despite the acceptance of the American rule, courts retain an in-
herent equitable power to shift fees in certain limited situations.3 One
exception occurs when a court finds that the losing party has acted "in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. '37 This com-
mon law exception applies when the court makes a subjective determi-
nation that a party filed or conducted the litigation in bad faith.3
Moreover, Congress explicitly has provided a number of specific in-
stances in which the court has discretionary power to award attorney's
fees.3 9 As the judicial system becomes increasingly complex and costly
and the dockets become increasingly overcrowded, some commentators
have advocated complete abandonment of the American rule as a way
of deterring too much litigation. 0
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 190-91.
34. Id. at 191.
35. Id. at 191-92.
36. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259; see also Clark v. C.I.R., 744 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1984).
37. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting F.P. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)); see also Actors Equity Ass'n v. American Dinner
Theatre, 802 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that the "underlying rationale of fee-shifting is
punishment of the wrongdoer rather than compensation of the victim").
38. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973); see also Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d
Cir. 1980) (requiring "'[c]lear evidence' that the claims are 'entirely without color and made for
reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes'" (emphasis in original)). To be
colorable, a claim must have "some legal and factual support considered in light of the reasonable
beliefs of the individual making the claim." Id.
39. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West Supp. 1987). This statute provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or
any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa-
tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excessive costs, expenses, and
attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Id.
40. Cf. Starr, supra note 27, at 191.
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B. The 1938 Version of Rule 11
The original version of Rule 1141 took effect in 1938 with the initial
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 42 Under the pre-
existing standards of code pleading, the attorney's signature on a plead-
ing merely certified that the pleading met the requisite substantive
form.4' The signer made no representation regarding the factual or legal
sufficiency of the allegations or content of the pleading."" The 1938 ver-
sion of the Rule added a new dimension to the attorney's signature on a
pleading by placing on the attorney the burden of ensuring that the
pleadings were accurate. 5
The original Rule 11 included two significant provisions: (1) the at-
torney's certification of the reasonableness and propriety of the plead-
ings, and (2) the court's power to strike "sham"'46 pleadings. The intent
of the Rule was to promote honesty and efficiency. 47 The Rule provided
that an attorney could be subjected to disciplinary action for a willful
violation of its terms. Generally, a showing of subjective bad faith was
required to prove a willful violation.4'8 This bad faith requirement gave
the attorney a viable defense if he could demonstrate a good faith reli-
ance on his analysis of the law or his client's rendition of the facts. 9
The judicial reasoning in cases under the original version of Rule 11 is
41. The version of Rule 11 enacted in 1938 provided:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer must be overcome by the testi-
mony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abol-
ished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken
if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1940).
42. Note, The Demise of a Subjective Bad Faith Standard Under Amended Rule
11-Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), 59 TEMP. L.Q.
107, 108 (1986).
43. Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11-Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate Require-
ment a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REv. 751, 752 (1985).
44. Id. at 752-53. There is some dispute on this premise. See Note, Attorneys: Deterrence of
Improper Pleading Practices by Awards of Attorneys' Fees, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 64-65 (1986).
45. Note, supra note 43, at 753.
46. A pleading is a "sham" if it is devoid of factual merit. A pleading lacking a meritorious
legal basis is considered "frivolous." Note, supra note 44, at 65.
47. Note, supra note 42, at 116.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 117.
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indistinguishable from that under the common law exception to the
American rule for vexatious or oppressive litigation brought in bad
faith.50
Nemeroff v. Abelson"1 is an excellent example of how courts ap-
plied the subjective bad faith standard under Rule 11. A shareholder
brought an action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 against the publisher, author, editor, and five in-
vestors of a financial column.5 2 The plaintiff claimed that a financial
columnist obtained nonpublic information, which he deliberately leaked
in his column and which the investors used to manipulate the price of
the stock for their own financial gain.53 After several months of discov-
ery failed to produce any evidence to support the plaintiff's claims, the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit.5 4 In the district court, the de-
fendant publisher sought and was awarded $50,000 in attorney's fees
against the plaintiff and his counsel for bringing the action in bad
faith. In reversing the award, the Second Circuit found that the plain-
tiff's attorney had possessed sufficient facts to support the claim despite
a subsequent discovery that these facts were false.56 The court stated
that the failure to validate facts before instituting an action, or the pos-
sibility that the facts are false, is irrelevant to the issue of bad faith.5 7
Instead, the court concluded that under original Rule 11, the test is
whether the action was instituted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly
or for oppressive reasons."58 The court indicated that the standard
under Rule 11 is interchangeable with the general common law excep-
tion to the American rule for vexatious or oppressive litigation.59
Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co.6 0 is another classic decision
under the original Rule 11. In this case, the defendant company fired a
Mexican employee for cursing at his foreman.6' The employee filed a
50. Compare cases discussed infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text with cases discussed
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
51. 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 341.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 342.
55. Id. The district court found that the action filed against the five investors was not in bad
faith and refused to award them attorney's fees and expenses. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp.
630, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 348-49.
57. Id. at 349. The Second Circuit stated that "[tihe question is whether a reasonable attor-
ney could have concluded the facts supporting the claim might be established, not whether such
facts actually had been established." Id. at 348 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 349 (quoting Browning Debenture Holder's Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1087-88 (2d Cir. 1977)).
59. Id.
60. 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1983).
61. Id. at 1162.
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Title VII class action after obtaining authorization from the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission.2 The named class included all
blacks, women, and hispanics who had been victims of the defendant's
discriminatory policies in hiring, training and placement, promotion,
termination, and discipline. The plaintiff further charged that the class
members had been victims of intimidation, threats, and verbal abuse.6 3
The plaintiff clearly lacked standing on virtually all the class claims.
Moreover, he had voluntarily withdrawn the class claims for which he
had standing, leaving the issue of Badillo's termination as the only issue
in the case.6 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant.6 5 In adjudicating the defendant's subsequent motion for
attorney's fees under the original Rule 11, the court recognized the ap-
propriateness of sanctioning willful violations that do not rise to a level
requiring disbarment.66 Moreover, the court affirmed the necessity of
applying the Rule in appropriate cases.1 In grasping for the correct
standard under which to judge the behavior of the plaintiff's counsel,
the court held that the subjective bad faith standard required a show-
ing of willful conduct. The defendant's failure to establish subjective
bad faith on the plaintiff's part defeated the claim. 8
Thus, although the original Rule 11 was part of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure from 1938 until the 1983 amendment, courts rarely
invoked the Rule.69 From 1938 until 1976 only nineteen Rule 11 mo-




65. Id. at 1163.
66. Id. at 1166.
67. Id. at 1167.
68. Id.
69. In Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Association, 365 F. Supp. 975
(E.D. Pa. 1973), the plaintiffs brought a class action against 177 mortgage-writing defendants com-
plaining that the defendants' failure to pay interest on escrow deposits constituted a conspiracy to
eliminate competition in violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 977. In selecting the proper defend-
ants, the plaintiffs simply named every individual or lending institution listed in the Philadelphia
phone book under headings related to mortgage brokers. Over 25% of the defendants subsequently
were dismissed from the action because they did not maintain escrow accounts. Id. at 977 n.1. The
court stated:
The plaintiffs' attorneys set out a dragnet. Having put large numbers of parties to the incon-
venience, expense and possible anxiety of being sued, they then were able conveniently to
separate the wheat from the chaff without great effort. They chose to inconvenience a large
number of parties rather than to inconvenience themselves with proper investigation as to
who the proper parties would be.
Id. at 982. The court refused to dismiss the entire action based upon the defendants' Rule 11
motion; however, the court intimated that the dismissed defendants were allowed to seek reim-
bursement of their costs. Id. at 983.
70. See Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with
19881
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ment 'of liberal pleading rules created an environment of vague,
generalized pleadings.7 1 The original Rule imposed no affirmative duty
to investigate claims, and the good faith defense sheltered all but the
most egregiously frivolous suits.72 Moreover, the common law already
provided an independent remedy in equity for frivolous, bad faith suits,
eliminating the need to invoke Rule 11.73 Courts, therefore, virtually
ignored Rule 11.
III. AMENDED RULE 11
A. Reasons for Amendment
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee amended Rule 1174 in 1983,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1976). Professor Risinger provides
an extensive list of the cases that applied Rule 11 during the 1938-76 time period. See, e.g., Bertu-
celli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1972); Lau Ah Yew v. Dunies, 236 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1956);
Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8 (D.V.Is. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 499 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974).
71. See Shuchman, Relations Between Lawyers, in ETHICS AND ADVOCACY: FINAL REPORT: AN-
NUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE 78 (1978) (stating that pleadings are essentially lies
and that an attorney knows that the recipient of a pleading drafted by him will not believe that all
the allegations can be proven; nor will plaintiff's counsel believe all the denials or claims of lack of
information in the answer).
72. See Note, supra note 43, at 755, 760; Note, supra note 42, at 116.
73. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
74. The italicized portions below indicate additions to the original Rule 11; the language in
parentheses has been deleted from the Rule.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other
paper and state his address. Except when otherwise provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief (there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay) formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a plead-
ing, motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. (or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken
if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.) If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983).
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for two reasons.7 5 First, courts had been reluctant to sanction attorneys
for Rule 11 violations. Second, proving subjective bad faith was diffi-
cult. The use of the original Rule 11 had been limited to instances of
bad faith, even though courts had inherent common law power to sanc-
tion attorneys and claimants for vexatious litigation. 6 By limiting the
application of the original Rule 11, the courts, in effect, provided a fo-
rum for abusive tactics" and increased the cost and complexity of liti-
gation.7 8 Concern over frivolous litigation had multiplied, and the
Committee determined that a strengthened Rule would provide the
courts with a method to quell the abuses.80 The Advisory Committee
noted that their goal was to discourage abusive tactics and to make the
litigation process more efficient by eliminating many frivolous claims.8 "
The drafters of amended Rule 11 deliberately altered and revised
the Rule's language to heighten the duty of counsel and specifically pro-
vide the sanction of fee shifting as an exception to the American rule.82
The new Rule allows the court discretion in assessing sanctions against
the client, directly against the attorney, or against both.8 3 Considering
the goals of the Rule, which are to sanction violations and deter abusive
practices, the best alternative in most cases is to sanction the attorney
directly 4 and mandate that the sanctions be nonreimbursable by, or
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983)
[hereinafter Advisory Notes].
76. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
182 (1985).
77. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1331 (Supp. 1986)
[hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
78. Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 182.
79. Preis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 802
F.2d 247, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[miounting federal caseloads and growing public
dissatisfaction" require active use of sanctions-"[]awyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take
heed!"); Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. CILCO, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 658 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 1985)
(holding that "widespread concern over frivolous litigation led to amendment"); see also Galanter,
supra note 7, at 5-6. The condition of American society may be described as "Hyperlexis."
. . . Whether or not America has experienced a "litigation explosion," or is suffering from
"legal pollution," or is in thrall to an "imperial judiciary," there has surely been an explosion
of concern about the legal health of American society. A battery of observers has concluded
that American society is overlegalized.
Id.
80. Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 181; Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 198.
81. Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 198.
82. Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. Corp. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 112 F.R.D. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that Rule 11 is not intended to do away with the American rule completely and that
courts have discretion in fashioning sanctions).
83. See supra note 21 (reprinting text of amended Rule 11).
84. Former Chief Justice Burger stated that "[j]udges in some state courts and in federal
courts have exercised their discretionary authority to impose sanctions both on attorneys, and
their clients for filing frivolous cases. . . . A few carefully considered, well-placed $5,000 or $10,000
penalties will help focus attention on the matter of abuses by lawyers." Burger, supra note 1, at 65;
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nonchargeable to, the client. Thus, Rule 11 will no longer allow the at-
torney to assert that his client directed or required his abusive behav-
ior. The attorney is in control of the litigation tactics and is in the best
position to prevent abuses. Any pleading, motion, or paper filed with
the court is prepared by, or under the direction of, the lawyer, and he is
ultimately responsible.
By its express terms, the original Rule 11 applied only to "plead-
ings." 85 Once the litigation proceeded beyond the initial pleading stage,
the attorney's signature on any motion or other filing provided no ex-
plicit certification. The amendments to Rule 11 extended the Rule's ap-
plication so that an attorney's signature on "every pleading, motion, or
other paper"8 now creates the same certification that original Rule 11
required only of the initial pleadings.
8 7
The amended Rule does not define what constitutes "other paper,"
and the question remains whether the courts have Rule 11 jurisdiction
over "other signed papers" not filed with the court. At least one court
has answered this question in the negative. In Adduono v. World
Hockey Association88 the Eighth Circuit held that district courts lack
jurisdiction to sanction an attorney for violating a settlement agreement
see also Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. Corp., 112 F.R.D. at 357 (indicating that "the district court
has the discretion to fashion a sanction for purposes of deterrence which awards part, but not all,
of the opposing party's attorney's fees. That is to say: adequate deterrence may permissibly fall
short of full compensation" (emphasis in original)).
85. For the text of the original Rule 11, see supra note 41.
86. Rule 11 applies to an answer in the form of a general denial. See United States v.
Minisee, 113 F.R.D. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1986). In defending an action for the collection of a defaulted
student loan, the defendant filed a general denial refuting the claim that the plaintiff applied for
the loan or received the proceeds. The court held that sanctions were mandatory under Rule 11
because counsel knew, or should have discovered, that the plaintiff received the loan proceeds and
should have admitted this in the answer. Id. at 122. The court found that the appropriate sanction
was a public reprimand of counsel for his inappropriate behavior. Id. at 123; see also Brown v.
National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1986) (dictating a $2538 attorney's fee
sanction against counsel for filing a groundless Motion to Produce Documents and Place Under
Court Seal and an additional $250 sanction for a groundless Motion for Reconsideration of Rule 11
Sanctions).
In Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985), defendant CBS filed an order to
show cause why a nonparty witness should not be held in contempt for refusing to submit to
deposition by videotape absent a court order. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court finding
that the law clearly required CBS to obtain a court order specifically subjecting the witness to
deposition by videotape; therefore, the petition to show cause "had absolutely no reasonable basis
in law or in fact." Id. at 1177. Because Rule 11 mandates sanctions for such a violation, the circuit
court reversed the lower court's denial of attorney's fees. Id. at 1178.
87. Rule 11 works in tandem with and complements the liberal fact pleading standards of the
American judicial system. See Woods v. Princeton Packaging, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 215, 217-18 (W.D.
Wash. 1987). But see Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100
HARv. L. Rzv. 630, 633-34 (1987) (arguing that recent interpretations of Rule 11 serve to under-
mine the entire federal scheme of liberal pleadings).
88. 824 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1987).
354
1988] APPLICATION OF RULE 11 355
term that was never submitted to the court or incorporated into any
document filed with the court."" The court explained that the term
"other paper" does not include such a settlement agreement.9 0 On the
other hand, nothing in the express language of the Rule strictly limits
its application to filed papers. Moreover, no policy analysis justifies a
distinction in the certification standards for filed and unfiled papers.
The amended Rule imposes a duty of "reasonable inquiry" on the
attorney who signs any paper filed with the court.9 1 According to the
Advisory Committee, a good faith belief in the validity of the facts or
law is no longer sufficient;92 the attorney has an affirmative duty to con-
duct a preliminary inquiry into the law and facts.93 The concept of
"reasonable inquiry, '9 4 however, is difficult to define, particularly be-
89. Adduono arose from a suit that was filed on behalf of 28 plaintiffs, primarily former
hockey players, against 84 defendants, including the World Hockey Association (WHA) and the
National Hockey League (NHL), alleging inter alia, antitrust violations and seeking pension bene-
fits. After two years, the original parties executed a settlement agreement that conditioned the
defendants' payment on a promise by plaintiffs' counsel not to represent any other plaintiffs in
similar actions against either the WHA or the NHL. Two months before the settlement was signed,
plaintiffs' attorney contacted a client who was not involved in the lawsuit and informed him of his
potential claims against the WHA and the NHL. The attorney then referred the client to the law
firm that had retained the attorney as an expert consultant. Id. at 618-19. The WHA sought Rule
11 sanctions for the plaintiffs' violation of the settlement agreement. The district court awarded
the WHA and the NHL $5000 each in fines and attorney's fees for counsel's "patent violation of
his obligations as an attorney to conduct himself honestly and forthrightly before the court." Id. at
619 (quoting Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 109 F.R.D. 375, 380 (D. Minn. 1986)). The award
was overturned on appeal. Id. at 622.
90. Id. at 621. The only reference to the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper is in
the Rule's discussion of sanctions: "[A]n appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
...expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper." FED. R. Civ. P.
11 (1983); see supra note 21 (reprinting the complete text of current Rule 11).
91. See supra note 21.
92. The Advisory Notes state:
While amended rule 11 purports to apply an objective test for what is reasonable inquiry, the
courts are faced with a very narrow interpretation of reasonableness on a case-by-case basis.
...Questions of subjective bad faith are still relevant where interpretation of the law is
involved and where the motive for filing a pleading, motion, or paper may be questioned.
Note, supra note 43, at 766.
93. See Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 198; 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, § 1333;
see also Cleveland Demolition Co., Inc. v. Azcon Scrip Corp., 827 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into fact and law may result in sanctions against
the plaintiff and his attorneys).
94. The Advisory Committee's Notes provide analytical factors to aid in the analysis of the
reasonableness of the inquiry. These factors include the amount of time available to the attorney,
the necessity of reliance only on the client for information, and the credibility of the legal
argument.
The Fifth Circuit, in Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 812 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1987),
provided a list of factors for district courts to consider in determining whether a party has made a
reasonable inquiry. With regard to the inquiry into facts, the court should assess the amount of
time available to the signer for investigation; the extent that factors necessitated the signer's reli-
ance on the client's factual account; the feasibility of a prefiling investigation and the need for
post-filing discovery to round out the factual claims; the complexity of the issues; and whether
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cause, unlike "reasonable care" or "reasonable person," "reasonable in-
quiry" in the context of Rule 11 lacks a well-established history of
judicial interpretation.95 Nevertheless, the legal profession is familiar
with the concepts of "reasonable inquiry" and "due diligence" in other
contexts.9" The intent of the Rule is to induce an attorney to conduct
an investigation and substantiate his factual allegations and legal theo-
ries before filing any papers.
Under the amended Rule, the court "shall" impose sanctions for
violations. 7 Because alleged violations of Rule 11 must be brought to
the attention of the court by way of a motion requesting sanctions, Rule
11 is not self-enforcing; the court may impose sanctions on its own mo-
tion or on the motion of a party." The new language is intended to
encourage courts to impose sanctions.99 An attorney also may bring an
present counsel received the case from previous counsel. Regarding the legal issues, the court
should consider the amount of time available to prepare the document, the plausibility of the legal
arguments, and the complexity of the issues. Id. at 988.
See Kamerman v. Steinberg, 113 F.R.D. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that reliance on newspa-
per articles in the Wall Street Journal and public SEC disclosure documents may be sufficient to
satisfy a reasonable factual investigation in a securities fraud action).
95. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think, and Investigate, 11 LITIGATION,
Winter 1985, at 13. These commentators suggest the following factors to consider when deciding
whether reliance on a client's account of the facts constitutes a "reasonable inquiry" into the facts:
(1) The existence of corroborating evidence; (2) costs of obtaining other evidence; (3) source of
client's information; (4) length and nature of attorney's relationship with the client; and (5) believ-
ability of client's story. Id. at 14.
96. Securities lawyers are familiar with the necessity of creating a paper trail to substantiate
a "due diligence" defense. One practitioner suggests that attorneys protect themselves by "docu-
menting efforts made to verify the accuracy and sufficiency of filings." Bates, The Rule 11 Debate,
4 Years Later: Lawyers Say It's Applied Unfairly, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, 3, col. 1 & at 42, col. 4.
The district judge in Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201 (E.D. Ky. 1987) suggested:
Although Rule 11 does not literally require it, it would be my advice to all attorneys to be
sure that the file contains at least a skeleton memo outlining concretely, not just abstractly,
the legal basis for every claim or defense. It should apply the law disclosed by reasonably
extensive legal research to the facts disclosed by a reasonably adequate factual investigation.
The analysis should be that of a reasonably competent attorney admitted to federal practice.
Id. at 208.
97. FED. R CIV. P. 11 (1983); see supra note 21 (reprinting text of Rule 11). In Wold v.
Minerals Engineering Co., 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983), the plaintiff filed a motion to disqual-
ify the defendant's counsel even though the plaintiff and his counsel had no ground for the motion.
Plaintiff's counsel failed to make a "reasonable inquiry" prior to filing the motion. The court found
that Rule 11 had been violated; therefore, the court was "compelled by [Rule 11] to impose appro-
priate sanctions." Id. at 167. The court ordered plaintiff's counsel to pay the defendant's expenses,
including attorney's fees, with no reimbursement from the plaintiff. Id. at 168.
98. Cf. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, § 1334.
99. According to Judge Schwarzer: "[L]awyers are generally reluctant to seek sanctions and
judges to impose them. The process is unpleasant, adds to the existing work, and increases the
tensions in the courtroom. . . . Judges may be uneasy about appearing to assume the role of po-
liceman, teacher, or moral guardian." Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 182. Moreover, standards of
appropriate conduct may be highly subjective, and judges are wary of imposing their own personal
concepts of professionalism on lawyers. Id. at 184; see also Note, supra note 42, at 141 (stating
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action under Rule 11100 in the appropriate circumstances,' 0' but should
bear in mind that an improper motion under Rule 11 may invoke Rule
11 liability for the one seeking its sanctions. 02
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger observed that old standards
that the "Rule encourages, and even tacitly demands, that judges take a more active role"); Advi-
sory Notes, supra note 75, at 200.
100. The timing of a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 may be determinative. In In re
Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision directing the verdict in defendant's favor and awarded him
$250,000 in attorney's fees for having to litigate the defamation suit. The Ninth Circuit disap-
proved of the district judge's allowing the entire trial to advance without mentioning sanctions
then awarding fees following the judgment. The court of appeals stated:
[This procedure] flies in the face of the primary purpose of sanctions, which is to deter subse-
quent abuses. This policy is not well served by tolerating abuses during the course of an
action and then punishing the offender after the trial is at an end.. .. [T]he accumulation
procedure . "tends to perpetuate the waste and delay which the rule[s are] intended to
eliminate."
Id. at 1183 (quoting Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 198); see also R.K. Harp Inv. Corp. v. McQuade,
825 F.2d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that "the imposition of sanctions must be divorced
from the ultimate disposition of the underlying action").
The appropriate time to move for sanctions depends on when the violation occurs. If the of-
fense occurs in the initial pleadings, either in the complaint or answer, a motion for sanctions may
be appropriate immediately. On the other hand, certain pleading offenses may not become obvious
until the trial begins. The court should keep in mind the deterrence goal when deciding whether to
sanction contemporaneously to the offense. Some pretrial abuses can be sanctioned in direct re-
sponse to the offense. A motion should be filed in response to misconduct during the trial; final
sanctions, however, should be withheld until the end of trial.
In Bannon v. Joyce Beverages, 113 F.R.D. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1987), the plaintiff alleged a number
of instances of misrepresentation and nondisclosure of material information by the defendant in
violation of federal securities laws. During discovery the plaintiff admitted that he used his own
independent judgment in deciding to sell his stock and that he knew, in advance of receiving the
allegedly fraudulent documents, information regarding four of the alleged misrepresentations and
omissions. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff amended his claims to drop those four allegations, but
added six additional claims. The defendant sought sanctions under Rule 11 for defending the four
claims. Id. at 670. The plaintiff requested that the court defer consideration on the motion until
the end of the trial. The court refused to defer consideration because the plaintiff had removed the
claims from the trial; therefore, the facts would develop no further. According to the court, "[T]he
sanctions issue will only grow cold and stale as it ages." Id. at 671. The court awarded the defend-
ant's counsel reimbursement for the amount of time expended discovering facts for the Rule 11
motions. Id. at 675.
101. Despite the general sentiment that the initiation of a sanctions proceeding is a "double-
edged sword," the attorney must consider the damage that the opposing party's improper tactics
causes his client. The injured client will typically be unaware of the availability of Rule 11 sanc-
tions, and, because professional bar sanctions provide no monetary compensation, the client will be
left without a remedy. "Thus, unethical conduct, if not egregious, remains essentially unchallenged
by the lay and legal communities." Axelberg, Sanctions Available for Attorney Misconduct: A
Glimpse at the "Other" Remedies, 47 MONT. L. REV. 87, 92 (1986).
102. The movant also may be awarded fees associated with pursuing the appeal of an im-
proper denial of Rule 11 sanctions by the district court. "It is very possible that appellate expenses
might exceed substantially the sanction in the district court, thus forcing many litigants . . . to
conclude that the vindication of the Rule 11 interest is not worth the candle. Unquestionably, this
would undermine the purposes behind Rule 11." Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1179
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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die hard, and new ideas generally are met with opposition.10 3 This
maxim is especially true about judges and lawyers accustomed to rely-
ing on precedent.10 4 Not surprisingly, the negative commentary and
predictions of doom regarding the amendments to Rule 11 have been
voluminous. 05 Nevertheless, the litigation crisis has become so severe
that outside intervention is necessary to reduce abuses and restore re-
spect for the judicial system. 06 The drafters of the amended Rule pro-
vided this outside intervention by establishing reasonable guidelines to
govern the conduct of litigants and counsel and prevent frivolous
lawsuits.
Many legal professionals vigorously opposed stiffening sanctions
under Rule 11 by arguing that attorney's fee motions would devolve
into satellite litigation and hinder attorney creativity in developing new
legal theories. 0 7 The Advisory Committee's Notes mandate that the
court observe due process concerns while keeping in mind the Rule's
purpose to decrease costs and condense litigation. For example, a party
seeking sanctions under the Rule must file a motion and notify the of-
fender of the motion. The court has the discretion to conduct a hearing
or allow proof regarding the reasonableness of the offender's conduct.10 8
The drafters recognized the danger of satellite litigation, but believed
that the scope of such litigation could be limited to preserve the benefit
of the Rule. 09 Likewise, the drafters recognized the Rule's potential for
103. Judicial Conference, supra note 7, at 207.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Joseph, The Trouble with Rule 11, 73 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87; Bates,
supra note 96, at 3, col. 1; Middleton, Was Request for Sanctions a Retaliatory Move?, Nat'l L.J.,
May 18, 1987, at 10, col. 1.
106. "[Llawyers have got to stop using the court system as a means of enriching themselves
at the expense of their clients. And the courts have got to stop allowing the lawyers to do it."
Burger, supra note 1, at 65.
However, some commentators and judges believe that the courts have become so willing to
invoke Rule 11 that the Rule has been overextended and that a rethinking of its application is
necessary. In Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201 (E.D. Ky. 1987), for example, the
court expressed these concerns before painstakingly setting out practical guidelines to which prac-
titioners should conform.
107. Judge Schwarzer states:
A lawyer may . .. be called on to explain the basis or purpose of a paper. But vigorous
advocacy is not contingent on lawyers being free to pursue litigation tactics that they cannot
justify as legitimate.. . . Unlike the polemicist haranguing the public from his soapbox in the
park, the lawyer enjoys the privilege of a professional license that entitles him to entry into
the justice system to represent his client and, in doing so, to pursue his profession and earn
his living. He is subject to the correlative obligation to comply with the rules and to conduct
himself in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of that system.
Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 184.
108. See Bannon v. Joyce Beverages, 113 F.R.D. 669, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
109. In Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987), the court discussed a number of
factors for consideration in determining the level of process due:
[I]nterests of attorneys and parties in having a specified sanction imposed only when justified;
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chilling advocacy;11 the notes expressly provide that the intent is not to
hinder creativity in legal thought."' Courts recognize that the hallmark
of the American legal system has been the creation of ingenious legal
theories. 1 2 As long as the lawyer has formulated a plausible argument
with ample support, the Rule protects his creativity.
Another major concern of the legal profession is the preservation of
client confidences' s and the attorney-client and work product privi-
the risk of an erroneous imposition of sanctions under the procedures used and the probable
value of additional notice and hearing; and the interests of the court in efficiently monitoring
the use of the judicial system and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional proce-
dural requirements would entail.
Id. at 1558. The court explained that the existence of the Rule itself provides a certain level of
notice. Notice in writing is not required in all instances. Nor is the formality of pleadings. The
accused always must be allowed to respond, but a separate sanction hearing is not always neces-
sary. Id. at 1560.
The procedure obviously must comport with due process requirements .... In many situa-
tions the judge's participation in the proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the
relevant facts and little further inquiry will be necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the pleading
regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions,
the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record.
Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 201.
110. Some judges have allegedly used Rule 11 to punish lawyers who "advance factual or
legal theories that break new ground or legitimately challenge existing precedent." Snyder, The
Chill of Rule 11, 11 LITIGATION, Winter 1985, at 16. Because no bright line divides acceptable
claims from unwarranted claims that should be sanctioned, lawyers may face a dilemma. Although
the attorney may consider the argument advanced a novel legal concept, the judge may deem the
argument a serious abuse of the pleading rules. The goals of punishment and deterrence should not
outweigh the drafters' obvious disinclination to "stifle legitimate innovation." Id. at 55.
Another commentator has observed that Rule 11 sanctions are most likely to be imposed in
public interest litigation such as suits to vindicate civil rights or alleged violations like employment
discrimination. The likelihood of sanctions may deter "[n]ew ideas of justice" and limit creative
theories, which in the past helped develop non-traditional actions protecting welfare benefits, a
right to integrated schools, the procreative choice and compensation for toxic torts. Note, supra
note 87, at 631-32, 652; see also Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th
Cir. 1987) (ruling that the plaintiff's "theory of due process is wacky, sanctionably so").
111. See Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 199 (stating that the "rule is not intended to chill
an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories"); see, e.g., Marco Hold-
ing Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that, in an extremely close
case, courts hesitate to impose sanctions, although initially inclined to do so, for fear of chilling
enthusiasm or creativity).
112. For example, the Second Circuit indicated:
[W]e do not intend to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of
the law. Vital changes have been wrought by those members of the bar who have dared to
challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized such innovation and industry would
run counter to our notions of the common law itself.
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. Model Code of Professional Responsibility, supra note 10, EC 4-1 (1981) provides:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning
of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one
who has employed or sought to employ him. . . The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:343
leges." 4 When faced with a Rule 11 challenge, an attorney may feel
compelled to divulge the contents of his legal research or conversations
and interviews with his client or other witnesses in order to rebut the
challenge. 615 The drafters did not intend the Rule to require disclosure
of privileged communications,11 6 but some commentators fear that such
disclosure may be the only defense to liability.1 17 Courts, however,
should be skeptical of a claim of privilege. To rebut a Rule 11 motion,
an attorney typically must disclose factual and legal research rather
than confidential conversations with clients." 8 The evidence disclosed is
the type that would eventually be disclosed during the litigation
process." 9
Although the attorney does have a duty to represent his client zeal-
ously,120 the attorney cannot use the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity as a buffer against Rule 11 sanctions for unwarranted litigation.'
2'
The lawyer has the prerogative, if not the duty, to choose his clients
carefully. The lawyer must remain in control of the professional rela-
tionship and impress upon his client the proper ethical and legal stan-
dards, notwithstanding the client's personal standards. 22  A
development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages lay-
men to seek early legal assistance.
Model Code, supra note 10, EC 4-4 provides:
The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard
the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege
exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the
knowledge.
114. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
115. Bannon v. Joyce Beverages, 113 F.R.D. 669, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
116. Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 199.
117. See, e.g., Note, supra note 43, at 769; see also Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 183. The
attorney-client privilege actually belongs to the client, who may absolutely prevent the attorney
from invoking the privilege when challenged. Note, supra note 43, at 769.
118. See Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 199-200.
119. Id.
120. Model Code, supra note 10, Canon 7. (A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law).
121. In Itel Containers International v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, 108 F.R.D. 96, 101
(D.N.J. 1985), the court stated:
The 1983 amendments were a response to the voices of bench and bar that litigation, in some
quarters, at least, was becoming more like an alley brawl than a search for the truth by
respected and respecting professional advocates. The adversary system commands vigorous
and zealous representation of one's client. The "battle" should be fought hard-but fought
fairly. Vigorous advocacy is not inconsistent with decent behavior toward one's adversary and
respect for the court. . . does not mean the advocate may dishonor the judicial system and
demean the court simply because it will advance his client's cause.
122. Freedman, supra note 9, at 46, 51. "[T]he lawyer is 'the master' who is 'to decide what
is morally. . . right, and who serves the client's needs but only 'as the lawyer sees them, not as the
client sees them.'" Id. at 46 (quoting Haynsworth, Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C. L. REV.
627, 628 (1976)). The system of professional independence enjoyed by the bar must be protected.
"Independence means the freedom to tell your client no.. . ." Cooper, supra note 8, at 57.
1988] APPLICATION OF RULE 11
counterbalance to the "client control"'23 duty is the attorney's duty to
refrain from trying facts. Provided that a client's account- of the facts
will be properly admissible testimony, the attorney may rely on the evi-
dence even if he is not absolutely certain the assertions are true. 24 The
attorney has no duty to assess the client's credibility once he satisfies
the Rule 11 standard for reasonable inquiry."2 5
B. Duties Under Rule 11
The amended Rule imposes three significant duties on the attorney
representing a party,12 or the party representing himself, 2 7 who signs a
pleading, motion, or other paper. The attorney's signature certifies that
he has conducted a reasonable inquiry," that the paper is well
123. Freedman, supra note 9, at 46.
124. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 95, at 15.
125. See infra notes 130-63 and accompanying text.
126. When more than one attorney signs a pleading, the provision applies to each attorney.
Moreover, an attorney who signs a paper drafted by a colleague may be liable for its contents.
Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. CILCO, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 660 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (deciding that
even though Rule 11 requires the lawyer who elects or agrees to sign a paper to take responsibility
for the contents this does not bar agency liability for those responsible for the filing); accord
Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 185 (advocating that the Rule allow for application of agency princi-
ples to find a nonsigning principal liable for a paper signed by an agent); cf. Robinson v. National
Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the nonsigning attorney who
appeared in the litigation may not be sanctioned).
127. The Advisory Committee's Notes manifest the drafters' intent that the Rule apply to
pro se litigants. The same standards apply; however, the court has wide discretion to consider
"special circumstances." Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 199.
In Young v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ind. 1984), a pro se plaintiff challenged an Internal
Revenue Service tax assessment by making "preposterous" allegations. Applying a subjective bad
faith standard, the district court found sanctions to be appropriate. Id. at 152. The court found
that the plaintiff had "no reasonable expectation of success on the merits." Id.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found that amended Rule 11 requires the district court to im-
pose sanctions on an unrepresented party who files a complaint "without some minimum of previ-
ous investigation." Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 1987). The fact
that the party prepared the complaint without the assistance of counsel is an invalid excuse for
failing to investigate and verify the factual elements supporting the action. Id.; see also Hilgeford
v. Peoples Bank, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (ordering a $1000 sanction against pro se
litigants).
In Clark v. Green, 814 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1987), a pro se plaintiff brought suit against the
University of Houston Police Department alleging that the police violated his constitutional rights
by issuing traffic tickets to a third party. Stating that the plaintiff's complaint was "vague" and
"incomprehensible," the district court dismissed the claim and ordered a sanction of $2500. The
Fifth Circuit imposed double costs and a $250 fine for the frivolous appeal. The court held that
"[w]hile [it does] not lightly impose sanctions at any time, [it is] particularly cautious when the
appellant appears pro se. Pro se litigants are not held to the standard of professionals, yet are not
granted unrestrained license to pursue totally frivolous appeals." Id. at 223.
128. An attorney may not rely on co-counsel to satisfy the inquiry requirement. Any certifi-
cation requires sufficient personal knowledge by the signer. The duty cannot be delegated. Unioil,
Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 548, 558 (9th Cir. 1986). At the very least, the signer must
have read any document that he signs. Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 206 (E.D.
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grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for modification, reversal, or extension of existing law, and that
the paper is not interposed for any improper purpose.'29
1. Reasonable Inquiry
The attorney's signature certifies that he has read the paper and
made a reasonable inquiry into both the facts and law to obtain knowl-
edge and information about and belief in the claims.130 Rule 11 does not
allow a "pure heart, empty head defense."13' The Advisory Committee's
Notes reiterate the necessity of conducting some prefiling inquiry; the
scope of the inquiry should be that which a reasonably competent attor-
ney practicing in federal court would conduct, taking into account all
pertinent circumstances. 32 Under this standard, a mere hunch that a
client has a cause of action is not enough; the attorney must have rea-
sonably reliable information to support the claim. 33 Likewise, naming
every possible defendant may no longer be a sound practice because the
attorney must have a reasonable belief of each defendant's liability.3
Ky. 1987).
129. See supra note 21 (reprinting text of current Rule 11).
130. Id.
131. See Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 187.
132. See Coburn Optical Indus., 610 F. Supp. at 659 (stating that the attorney cannot rely
solely on his client's rendition of the facts even if the client is trustworthy because the attorney
must make a reasonable inquiry); see also Mossman v. Roadway Express, Inc., 789 F.2d 804 (9th
Cir. 1986) (allowing imposition of sanctions when the motion is not well grounded in fact).
133. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 95, at 15.
134. In Foster v. Michelin Tire Corp., 108 F.R.D. 412 (C.D. Ill. 1985), the plaintiff brought a
products liability action against three tire manufacturers. The plaintiff's attorney admittedly did
not know which of the defendant manufacturers actually produced the tires on the truck that was
responsible for the death of the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 414. The court held that the plaintiff's
failure to conduct any prefiling inquiry into the facts was a clear violation of Rule 11. Although the
Rule does not require perfect pleadings or production of "information sufficient to sustain a
claim," some inquiry is necessary. Id. at 416. The court recognized that prefiling inquiry may be
costly to the plaintiff, but emphasized the savings to the entire legal system. "Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 specifically aims at preventing the costs attendant upon a 'sue now, inquire later'
mentality." Id. at 415.
In Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff filed a products liability
action against nine pharmaceutical manufacturers who were involved in the manufacture and sale
of tetracycline-based drugs, which allegedly discolored the plaintiff's teeth. Id. at 1218. The plain-
tiff's childhood medical records revealed only that the plaintiff took drugs manufactured by four of
the defendants. Id. at 1219. The district court granted summary judgment for the other five de-
fendants, including Upjohn. Upjohn sought Rule 11 sanctions on grounds that the plaintiff failed
to conduct a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts. Id. The plaintiff had possession of or ac-
cess to the medical records at least 11 months prior to filing. The plaintiff asserted a number of
factual circumstances to support her contention that she had satisfied her Rule 11 duty, including
the fact that her medical records were old, often illegible, and lost or missing in some cases, and
that Upjohn was a leading defendant in tetracycline cases. Id. at 1220. The Sixth Circuit held that
the plaintiff's prefiling investigation was insufficient because she had no specific factual evidence to
support her claims against Upjohn. Id. at 1221-22.
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Thus, the "shotgun" approach to pleading probably is now actionable.
A number of cases attempting to assess the reasonableness of the
prefiling inquiry rest on whether the attorney conducted any inquiry.1 5
In Viola Sportswear Inc. v. Mimun 38 the plaintiff, who had the exclu-
sive license to manufacture and sell children's Sasson jeans, filed an ac-
tion alleging unfair competition and trademark infringement. This case,
which further alleged a nationwide trademark conspiracy, was based on
the defendant's unauthorized sale of a single pair of jeans worth ap-
proximately ten dollars.187 The plaintiff made no effort to investigate
the facts or question the defendant before filing and refused to dismiss
the action after initial discovery produced no factual basis for his com-
plaint. 13 8 In assessing $20,000 in attorney's fees against the plaintiff and
his attorneys, jointly and severally, the court held that sanctions were
warranted by the plaintiff's failure to conduct any prefiling inquiry that
would have produced facts to support his claims. 3 9
The reasonable inquiry requirement is equally important, if not
more so, when applied to the investigation into legal theories. Although
misinformation or inaccuracy about the facts may be excused in some
circumstances, misinformation about the law will not, or should not, be
overlooked.14 0 The attorney in certain circumstances may rely on his
client to supply accurate facts; however, assessment of the legal theories
is entirely within the realm of counsel.
In Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc."' the plaintiff filed a
civil rights action in federal court against the city, a police superinten-
dent, two policemen, a corporation, and two corporate employees for
In a footnote, the court addressed the plaintiff's alternative contention that the complaint
against the group of tetracycline manufacturers was justified under a joint enterprise theory of
liability "warranted by existing law." Id. at 1221 n.5. In rejecting the alternative contention, the
Sixth Circuit made an important distinction. A concert of action or joint enterprise theory of lia-
bility is a legal theory, applicable only when the plaintiff is unable to identify any specific product
to which she was exposed. Upjohn, in its Rule 11 motion challenged the sufficiency and reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's factual inquiry. She had identified four manufacturers, but included nine
defendants in her complaint in violation of Rule 11. A legal theory based on joint enterprise is
warranted only if no evidence exists by which the plaintiff can identify the specific manufacturer
of products to which she was exposed. Id. at 1221.
135. "The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the
signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or
other paper was submitted." Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 199.
136. 574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
137. Id. at 620.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 621.
140. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 95, at 15; see also In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d
441, 447 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[a]n attorney who wants to strike off a new path in the law
must make an effort to determine the principles he is applying").
141. 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984). For an in depth criticism of Lincoln Towing as a
judge's improper application of Rule 11, see Snyder, supra note 110, at 16.
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violating his rights under the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and
eighth amendments to the United States Constitution and his four-
teenth amendment due process guarantee. The plaintiff also alleged
conspiracy and numerous state claims.142 The claims arose out of the
plaintiff's arrest, and later acquittal, for reportedly throwing paint on
the defendant towing service's building after the company ordered the
plaintiff's car towed.14  The court found the plaintiff's claims com-
pletely unsupportable at law, a fact that a small amount of research
would have revealed. 44 The failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry is a
clear violation of amended Rule 11. The court held that the new Rule
specifically was intended to eliminate the type of "shotgun" pleading
involved in Lincoln Towing.
145
Courts will not allow an attorney to justify violations of Rule 11 by
relying on his duty to his client.14 6 In Mohammed v. Union Carbide
Corp.147 a district court acknowledged counsel's duty to represent zeal-
ously his client. The plaintiff raised libel and slander claims, and his
counsel did not obtain any evidence or conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the claims.' 48 The court found that an attorney has a duty to dis-
courage his client from bringing specious claims.1 9 The determination
of whether "reasonable inquiry" has occurred to avoid these specious
claims can be objectively made and proven by focusing on observeable
events. The attorney, therefore, should have attempted to corroborate
his client's account.150 This standard allows for consideration of the
facts specific to the case; but at the least, the attorney still must con-
duct some investigation and document the steps taken in order to sat-
isfy his duty under Rule 11.111
142. 596 F. Supp. at 15.
143. Id. at 16.
144. Id. at 16-17.
145. Id. at 27; see also Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
The plaintiff, a salesman for 14 years, filed suit against his former employer following plaintiff's
termination. The court dismissed the entire action for failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted. The plaintiff's employment was "at will," and his claim for age discrimination could
not succeed because he was only 39-years-old. In awarding the defendants attorney's fees against
plaintiff's counsel, the court found that the complaint "completely fail[s], under well established
law, to state a claim." Counsel obviously made inadequate inquiry into the law. Id. at 1281.
146. "The profession has . . . long recognized limits to zealous advocacy. While these limits
are not marked by bright lines, the lawyer's concurrent obligations as an officer of the court have
been repeatedly and clearly articulated." Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 189. For a discussion of the
conflicts between a duty to the client and Rule 11 requirements, see Withered, Lawyers Dilemma:
Frivolous Lawsuits and Duties to Clients, 30 REs GEsTAE 164 (1986).
147. 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
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The certifications provided by the attorney's signature govern the
entire proceeding so that subsequent developments may require the at-
torney to withdraw the claim.1 52 In Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road
Machinery'5" the plaintiff lost his arm in a corn chopper manufactured
by the defendant. The complaint, which was based on the attorney's
good faith reliance on oral information obtained from his client, alleged
that the accident occurred in 1977.'5 The accident actually occurred in
1976 and, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations when the
action was filed.155 The plaintiff's attorney had failed to review any of
the client's medical records before filing even though the client had re-
tained the attorney four years earlier. 156 The attorney claimed that an
ethical duty to his client prevented him from dismissing the action
when the actual date of the accident was brought to his attention. 57
The court found that the attorney had an ethical duty to dismiss the
lawsuit when he learned that his client had no case, even if the client
resisted dismissal. 58 As an officer of the court, the attorney's ethical
duty to the judicial system and the general public outweighs any duty
to his client when the two are in conflict.'59
Similarly, in Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc.160 the Fifth
Circuit held that an attorney who fails to review and evaluate his posi-
tion during the development of the case may be subject to Rule 11
sanctions.' The defendant employer requested attorneys' fees follow-
ing an employee's unsuccessful thirteenth amendment, Title VII, and
section 1981 claims. The court held that if the attorney discovers during
the course of the litigation that the factual or legal basis for the litiga-
152. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 112 F.R.D. 664, 667
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that counsel has a duty to continue the investigation during the interim
between filing the initial complaint and the amended complaint three months later); see also
Bannon v. Joyce Beverages, 113 F.R.D. 669, 675 (N.D. Iln. 1987) (finding that although the party is
liable for all improper claims, dropping claims by amendment may mitigate damages so that the
penalty would not be as harsh).
153. 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1948).




158. Id. at 1251; see also Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 104 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (stating
that Rule 11 imposes a requirement that the attorney "continually review, examine, and re-evalu-
ate his position"). But see Pantry Queen Foods v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, 809 F.2d 451, 454 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 11 does not require a party or an attorney to continue his investiga-
tion after filing a paper or updating any filing); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986)
(explaining that "[l]awyers may not be penalized under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for failing to withdraw
federal lawsuits that prove groundless after they are filed").
159. Bannon, 581 F. Supp. at 1251.
160. 812 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1987).
161. Id. at 988.
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tion no longer exists, he has a duty to assure that the litigation does not
proceed."0 2 The attorney may choose one of a number of options de-
pending on the facts, including withholding opposition to a summary
judgment motion, abstaining from prosecution of the action, withdraw-
ing a document, or dismissing the case.
163
2. Well Grounded in Fact and Law
Federal Rule 11 further provides that an attorney's signature certi-
fies that the paper "is well grounded in fact and is warranted by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law."'1 4 This requirement takes the reasonable in-
quiry standard one step further: The attorney not only must inquire
into the facts and research the law, but also must be candid with the
court.6 5 The duty of candor has been mandated by both the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct.66
Now the duty is implicit in Rule l's requirements. 6 7 The duty of can-
dor requires that the attorney disclose any law of the controlling juris-
diction that is adverse to his position .1 6  No aspect of the candor
requirement, however, demands that the attorney refrain from encour-
aging change in or extension of existing law.169
In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.1 0 Judge
Schwarzer, an advocate of vigorous application of Rule 11,171 made a
strong statement regarding the duty of candor. The defendant, after
successfully removing a breach of contract, fraud, and negligence action
162. Id.
163. Id. at 989; see also Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1987) (stating that the duty under Rule 11 is "not a one time only obligation"); Jackson
Marine Corp. v. Harvey Barge Repair, Inc., 794 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that volun-
tary dismissal was not required, and that Rule 11 is satisfied if the party does not oppose a motion
for summary judgment).
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For the text of current Rule 11, see supra note 21.
165. Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 193.
166. MODEL CODE, supra note 10, DR 7-102(A)(3), (A)(5); DR 7-106(B)(1); see also MODEL
RULES, supra note 11, Rule 3.3. Model Rule 3.3 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel; ...
167. Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 193-94.
168. See supra note 166.
169. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 95, at 15; Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 194.
170. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
171. Judge Schwarzer authored the article, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985), which explains the duty of candor and its relevance.
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to federal court and transferring the action from Minnesota to Califor-
nia, moved for dismissal of the claims based on the running of the Cali-
fornia statute of limitations.7 The defendant's counsel submitted in
support of the motion a memorandum which seemingly argued that ex-
isting principles of law bolstered the defendant's position. Judge
Schwarzer denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of merit
and, on his own motion, gave notice of Rule 11 sanctions against coun-
sel. In his memorandum opposing sanctions, defendant's counsel made
a plausible argument for extension of present law, despite his prior
claim that the existing law supported his position.173 The court found
the second argument to be valid, but held that the inconsistency be-
tween the two arguments was precisely the type of practice Rule 11 was
designed to prohibit.174 Judge Schwarzer was particularly offended by
the misleading nature of counsel's argument and accordingly assessed
more than $3000 of plaintiff's attorney fees against defendant's
counsel.
17 5
The Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Schwarzer's district court opin-
ion in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp., but rejected the implied duty
of candor as described by Judge Schwarzer.' 76 The court found that the
literal text of Rule 11 does not require counsel to inform the court
whether his argument is based on existing law or on an extension or
modification of existing or contrary law.1 77 The Rule 11 certification is
simply a certification that the paper meets the proscribed requirements,
and no further explanation is necessary. 7 s The court expressed concern
that at times counsel may not be able accurately to categorize his argu-
ment. Moreover, Rule 11 was amended to reduce costs and delay in the
judicial process; yet the district court's application might increase costs
and create excess litigation by requiring counsel to justify his argu-
ments. 79 The Ninth Circuit believed that the district court's applica-
tion of Rule 11 was an improper attempt to enforce ethical standards
by means of procedural rules.8 0
172. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 103 F.R.D. at 125.
173. Id. at 126.
174. Id. at 127.
175. Id. at 128.
176. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1541-42 (9th Cir. 1986).
177. Id. at 1538-39.
178. Id. at 1539-40.
179. Id. at 1541.
180. Id. at 1539. But see Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the
court stated:
Perhaps the greatest safeguard against [the danger of frivolous claims] is the integrity and
good sense of practicing lawyers who, as officers of the court, have both an ethical and a legal
duty to screen the claims of their clients for factual veracity and legal sufficiency.. . . [We
penalize attorneys under Rule 11] only where they have failed to maintain a minimum stan-
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Although ethical standards clearly mandate a duty of candor and
Rule 11 implicitly includes the same duty, the Ninth Circuit refused to
incorporate the duty into Rule 11 standards.181 The success of the
amended Rule depends on its vigorous application, but this court seem-
ingly is reluctant to sanction conduct that typically has been seen as
"acceptable" in practice. Only to have his decision overturned on ap-
peal, Judge Schwarzer, who witnessed the proceedings and had the
"discretion" to fashion a sanction,182 found counsel's conduct suffi-
ciently egregious to warrant application of Rule 11.183
A number of courts have held that Rule 11 applies to the pleading
or motion as a whole, so that Rule 11 cannot be utilized to challenge
individual issues in an action. In Martinez, Inc. v. H. Landau & Co. 184
the plaintiff, citing four alternative grounds, filed a motion to dismiss
the defendant's counterclaim. The plaintiff later withdrew the entire
motion to dismiss following a Supreme Court decision in a similar case
rejecting two of the grounds cited by the plaintiff.' 85 In Martinez the
defendant sought fees for defending against the motion to dismiss, la-
beling the motion without basis in law and contrary to precedent.18 6
The defendant's Rule 11 challenge was directed solely toward the two
grounds not addressed by the Supreme Court. The district court re-
jected the defendant's motion under Rule 11, holding that the Rule was
designed to address the pleading as a whole. 187 The court feared that
inconsistent results and an undesirable effect on courtroom strategy
would occur if attorneys were discouraged from raising questionable le-
gal issues together with valid issues.188 According to the court, the ap-
plication of Rule 11 to individual arguments would lead to the
increased litigation and abusive tactics that the Rule was intended to
quell.
89
dard of professional responsibility.
Id. at 87.
181. Golden Eagle Distr. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1539.
182. Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 200.
183. See also Hurd v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 824 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1987) (overturning the
district court award of $5813 in sanctions to the defendants).
184. 107 F.R.D. 775 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
185. Id. at 776. In 1985 the United States Supreme Court settled a conflict between the
Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit by hearing two cases on the issue, see Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). The Court over-
turned Sedima, the case on which the Martinez plaintiff had relied.
186. Martinez, 107 F.R.D. at 776-77.
187. Id. at 777.
188. Id. at 778.
189. Id. at 779; see also Baranski v. Serhant, 106 F.R.D. 247 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding the
sanction inappropriate against attorneys who filed pleading containing 38 viable claims and includ-
ing 8 time-barred claims by mistake).
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In contrast, the district court decision of Kuzmins v. Employee
Transfer Corp. s0 found Rule 11 to be an acceptable sanction when por-
tions of the plaintiff's complaint were without merit. The plaintiff insti-
tuted a sex discrimination case, which also alleged violations of her
rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution.'1" The plaintiff's civil rights claims were dismissed and
stricken from the complaint for failure to meet the state action require-
ment. 92 The court assessed against the plaintiff's counsel the $100 at-
torney's fee incurred by the defendant in arguing the dismissal of the
unfounded civil rights claims. The court found that counsel failed to
make even a minimal inquiry into the law.193
3. Improper Purpose
The third certification under Rule 11 provides that the paper in
question must not have an improper purpose, such as harassment or
delay. The intended application of the language is unclear from the
context of the Rule and the Advisory Notes. On its face, the Rule incor-
porates language that typically has dictated a subjective analysis of the
drafters' intent.19 4 The determination of whether a signer had an im-
proper purpose or intended harassment or delay is not conducive to an
objective analysis. Although the improper purpose language has not
been interpreted uniformly by the courts, most courts and commenta-
tors now agree that the drafters of the Rule 11 amendments intended to
limit subjective determinations of the signer's prefiling state of mind.195
Thus, the courts now have adopted an objective analysis, overruling
previous applications of Rule 11.196
The cases interpreting the improper purpose language indicate that
a split may be developing. 19 On one side are courts that refuse to con-
duct any determination of subjective intent in assessing whether a Rule
11 violation has occurred. 98 If the signer has conducted a reasonable
190. 587 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
191. Id. at 537.
192. Id. at 538.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 21.
195. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. Compare cases discussed infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text with cases dis-
cussed infra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
198. See Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987). In Hearld v. Barnes & Spec-
trum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Tex. 1985), the plaintiff's attorney asserted a subjective
good faith defense to a motion for fees under Rule 11. The court was hesitant to sanction the
attorney because the judge was personally familiar with the reputation for ethical, competent be-
havior of both the attorney and his law firm. The court elected to ignore issues of subjective bad
faith as irrelevant under amended Rule 11. Id. at 19.
19881
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:343
inquiry to determine that the paper is factually and legally sufficient,
the court will conclude that the paper was not interposed for any im-
proper purpose. Under this reading, the improper purpose language is
superfluous and places no additional duty on the signer. In Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles199 the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 11 does not
require that a party's legal theory be correct. Therefore, the granting of
summary judgment or dismissal for failure to state a claim does not
resolve the sanction issue. Rather, the court must make an objective
determination whether the party violated the Rule 11 requirements. 00
Likewise, a violation of the improper purpose clause requires an objec-
tive analysis.0 1
On the other side are courts that read the improper purpose lan-
guage as establishing a distinct third duty incorporating a subjective
analysis.0 2 Under this interpretation, an attorney can violate Rule 11
even though the claim has merit if the attorney has an improper pur-
pose.203 Undoubtedly, the determination that an attorney adopted a po-
sition for an improper purpose may be difficult to make. Nevertheless,
some courts have adopted a subjective analysis in the limited circum-
stances in which harassment or some other improper purpose is in
issue.20 4
In assessing a $5000 sanction against the plaintiff's attorney, the court found that the plain-
tiff's response was filed for an "improper purpose." Although diversity had been destroyed, the
plaintiff had attempted to arrange the parties interested in the litigation to maintain an appear-
ance of diversity. Id. at 19. "The federal court system was manipulated for ends inimicable to
those for which it was created. The minimum standards of this noble profession were not main-
tained but were subverted for improper purpose." Id. at 20; see also In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D.
493, 498 (N.D. IM. 1985) (holding that "improper purpose" may be an aggravating factor for sanc-
tions, but that its absence is not a defense under the objective standard).
199. 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
200. Id. at 831.
201. Id.
Harassment under Rule 11 focuses upon the improper purpose of the signer, objectively
tested, rather than the consequences of the signer's act, subjectively viewed by the signer's
opponent.
*. . We hold that a defendant cannot be harassed under Rule 11 because a plaintiff files
a complaint against that defendant which complies with the "well grounded in fact and war-
ranted by existing law" clause of the Rule.
Id. at 832.
202. See, e.g., Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 208 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
203. Id.
204. In Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1987), the defendant
filed a counter claim requesting $200,000 compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive dam-
ages. On appeal the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court's dismissal of the counterclaim on
the merits; however, the court affirmed Rule 11 sanctions against the defendant with regard to the
damage prayer. The court found that such an outrageous prayer indicates that the counterclaim
was brought for the improper purpose of harassing the plaintiff. Id. at 457.
Similarly, in Holley v. Guiffrida, 112 F.R.D. 172 (D.D.C. 1986), the court held the plaintiff's
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C. Establishing an Appropriate Standard
Rule 11 causes confusion because it does not provide the courts
with a standard for assessing counsel's state of mind. This confusion
has spurred a debate over the viability of a good faith defense to a Rule
11 motion. 5 Under the original Rule 11, courts required that the mo-
vant prove that the offending counsel acted in bad faith. 06 By amend-
ing Rule 11, the drafters expressed their intent to remove the subjective
analysis207 from the Rule. 20 8 Willfulness is no longer a prerequisite for
Rule 11 sanctions. 09 Courts not presently applying the objective stan-
dard provided by the amended Rule should consider changing their po-
sition. Rule 11 as amended will have its intended effect only if bad faith
considerations are no longer relevant. 10
1. Subjective
Despite the seemingly clear intent of Rule 11 as amended, some
courts have continued to require a showing of bad faith before imposing
sanctions. Moreover, some courts either articulate no clear standard
or claim to accept the new objective standard 21 2 and then conclude that
$400 million damage prayer unreasonable and unrelated to any alleged damages: "Indeed, this
confluence of barred claims and this outlandish prayer for damages forces this Court to conclude
that plaintiff's suit was designed only to harass the defendants." Id. at 173.
205. Compare cases discussed infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text with cases discussed
infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 41-68 and accompanying text.
207. Although the court is not required to delve into the attorney's psyche to assess his in-
tent, a number of considerations may be relevant to the determination of the appropriateness of
Rule 11 sanctions. The court may consider personal knowledge of the specific case and of litigation
in general and the standards in the area. The court also may consider the burden and expense of
the litigation.
208. Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 195 (stating that "the rule is not limited to papers filed in
bad faith").
209. Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 200. "This standard is more stringent that the original
good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its
violation." Id. at 198-99.
210. Judge Schwarzer stated:
Were a court to entertain inquires into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of
potentially harmful consequences, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and
chilling advocacy. At the same time, some offenders might escape for lack of sufficient evi-
dence of bad faith. Finally, a bad faith test would make courts more reluctant to impose
sanctions for fear of stigmatizing a lawyer by a bad faith finding.
Schwarzer, supra note 76, at 196.
211. See, e.g., In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985); Nelson v. Piedmont Avia-
tion, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
212. In Itel Containers International Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108
F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1985), the plaintiff erroneously alleged diversity jurisdiction in the complaint
served on the defendant. Rather than assert an affirmative defense or deny diversity, the defend-
ant allowed the litigation to proceed for two years. The defendant's strategy was to withhold his
motion for dismissal until the statute of limitations had run. In assessing Rule 11 sanctions against
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the accused party should be sanctioned because he met the bad faith
standard. This occurred in Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upman &
Co.,213 in which the plaintiff broker brought suit against his employer. A
controversy had arisen over plaintiff's involvement in a transfer of
stocks to a customer.21 4 An arbitrator settled the dispute, finding that
the customer was entitled to the transfer and that the plaintiff had ac-
ted properly.21 5 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit against the employer
and a branch manager for malicious prosecution in instituting arbitra-
tion proceedings, defamation, and emotional distress. His wife sought
damages for loss of services.2 16
Although the Tedeschi case was decided under original Rule 11,
the court noted that the recently enacted amendments were designed to
emphasize powers already available to the court. 17 In applying the
post-amendment standard, the court nevertheless required a showing of
bad faith. The court described a claim as being brought in bad faith
when it is entirely without merit and is brought for an improper pur-
pose. is Under this bad faith standard, the court found the plaintiff's
claim to be unsupportable in the law and assessed $5000 in attorney's
fees against the plaintiff's counsel.
Likewise, in Gieringer v. Silverman219 the Seventh Circuit refused
to assess sanctions against the plaintiff because the defendant did not
show bad faith.220 The plaintiff shareholders alleged violations of securi-
ties laws in a stock redemption offer by the defendant corporate direc-
tors and officers. 21 The court granted summary judgment for the
defendants because the one-year statute of limitations had expired.222
The defendants sought sanctions under Rule 11, claiming that the
plaintiff's action was without color or legal basis and was brought as a
strike suit to harass the defendants.23 The Court of Appeals upheld the
district court's finding of lack of bad faith based on the plaintiff's at-
tempt to negotiate a settlement of the price-per-share in advance of
defendant's counsel, the court found bad faith. "A finding of willfulness or lack of good faith is not
required in determining a violation of Rule 11; however, if there were such a requirement, it would
here be met." Id. at 102 (citations and footnote omitted).
213. 579 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 147 (1986).
214. Id. at 658-59.
215. Id. at 659.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 659 n.3.
218. Id. at 661.
219. 731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984).
220. Id. at 1281.
221. Id. at 1275.
222. Id. at 1276.
223. Id. at 1281.
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trial.224 Moreover, the parties had a legitimate dispute over when the
cause of action arose for statute of limitations purposes. The dispute
over the issue of the statute of limitations added weight to the plain-
tiffs complaint and made sanctions unwarranted.22
2. Objective
Courts generally have recognized that amended Rule 11 requires an
objective analysis of an attorney's conduct to assess whether he made a
reasonable inquiry and whether the claim was well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law.226 By deleting certain provisions of the origi-
nal Rule,2 7 the drafters intended to remove the issue of an attorney's
honesty from Rule 11 analysis.228 The courts' inquiry focuses only on
the merits of the pleading gleaned from facts and law known or availa-
ble to the attorney at the time of filing. 229 The court should determine
objectively the propriety of sanctions without conducting an explora-
tion of the attorney's subjective intentions.
In Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York25 0 the Second
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1282.
226. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987); Invst Fin. Group v. Chem-
Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1987); Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Brockway Imco. Inc., 809 F.2d
1039, 1044 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate if the plaintiff has a
"glimmer of a chance of prevailing"); Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986) (ruling that a Rule 11 attorney's fee sanction is especially appropriate
in response to an objectively unreasonable challenge to an arbitration award); Orange Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Frontline Ventures Ltd., 792 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1986); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788
F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that Rule 11 may "be seen as a litigation version of the
familiar railroad crossing admonition to 'stop, look, and listen' "); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
N.Y., 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago Metal Mfr. Co., No. 84C 7208
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1985).
227. The drafters deleted provisions for striking pleadings and motions as sham and false
and references to scandalous and indecent matter. See supra note 74.
228. Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 199.
229. Id.; see also supra note 135.
230. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Eastway I]. For an in-depth discussion of the
Eastway I decision, see Note, supra note 42.
On remand for determination of the appropriate attorney's fee and allocation of fees between
the party and counsel, Judge Weinstein observed that the purpose of the Rule 11 fee shifting
provision is deterrence.
Because such provisions 1) are in derogation of the general American policy of encouraging
resort to the courts for peaceful resolution of disputes, 2) tend to breed time-consuming and
expensive satellite litigation, and 3) increase tensions among the litigating bar and between
bench and bar, the standard for imposition of sanctions is high.. . . [F]ees are to be awarded
only if the claim or motion was entirely unjustified, i.e. frivolous.
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) [hereinafter Eastway
II]. Although the defendant claimed over $52,000 in attorney's fees, the court limited the sanction
to $1000 against the plaintiff only.
The defendant appealed the low award as an abuse of discretion. In Eastway Construction
Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Eastway III], the Court of
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Circuit clearly articulated the intent of amended Rule 11 in a decision
overturning the district court's denial of sanctions, which was based on
a finding that the plaintiff's case was not frivolous. 31 The court noted
that although the original Rule was written to allow a subjective bad
faith analysis, the amended Rule is markedly different. The court
placed special emphasis on the words "formed after a reasonable in-
quiry" and held that the addition of these words places on the attorney
an affirmative duty to inquire into the validity of the pleadings and
destroys the availability of a good faith defense. 3 2 The court found the
message of the amended Rule to be explicit and devoid of ambiguity.
The court concluded that subjective good faith was no longer an abso-
lute defense.33
In McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.23 4 the defend-
ant's counsel, in seeking removal to federal court, took a position in
direct opposition to a long standing, well settled Supreme Court case.
The court first recognized that the intent of the amendment of Rule 11
was to put some "bite" in the Rule.23 5 In rejecting counsel's good faith
defense,236 the court distinguished between the acceptable practice of
arguing a novel legal concept and the unacceptable "defiance of settled
case law.
'237
The cases that apply the objective standard, as clearly explained in
Eastway I, follow the intent of amended Rule 11. Courts should no
longer use subjective bad faith language. References to and applications
of outdated standards cloud the issues and prevent articulation of a
predictable sanctioning policy. The rule cannot be an effective deter-
rent unless attorneys are able to anticipate the standard that the courts
will apply.
Appeals, with little discussion, increased the award to $10,000 and ordered the plaintiff and coun-
sel to divide the cost equally. The court recognized that Rule 11 allows the trial judge discretion to
award only a portion of the prevailing party's attorney's fees as the sanction. Nevertheless, "[tihe
concept of discretion implies that a decision is lawful at any point within the outer limits of the
range of choices appropriate to the issue at hand; at the same time, a decision outside those limits
exceeds or, as it is infelicitously said, "abuses" allowable discretion." Id. at 123.
231. Eastway I, 762 F.2d at 252.
232. Id. at 253-54.
233. Id. at 253.
234. 105 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Ala. 1985).
235. Id. at 625.
236. Despite the articulated rejection of the subjective standard, the court seemed to place
tremendous emphasis on the obvious bad faith of counsel in delaying the removal petition until
the jury selection had begun. The court observed that the defendant's removal petition was only in
response to a seemingly unfavorable jury. Id. at 626 n.1; see also, supra note 211.
237. McLaughlin, 105 F.R.D. at 625.
[Vol. 41:343
19881 APPLICATION OF RULE 11
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Standard of Review
Typically, and correctly, appellate courts accord great deference to
the decision of trial judges on the issue of attorney sanctions.238 Defer-
ential treatment is desirable because trial judges personally observe the
proceedings and are best equipped to assess sanctions. The term "sanc-
tion," after all, denotes a punishment, and trial judges witness the
wrongdoing that necessitates the punishment. When determining the
the reasonableness of inquiry or grounding of the facts and law,239 trial
courts should not embark on a subjective analysis of an attorney's state
of mind, but subjective considerations may be relevant to the determi-
nation of the severity of the sanction.24 °
Although the express language of Rule 11 requires that the district
court impose an "appropriate" sanction, if a paper is signed in violation
of the Rule, the determination of what constitutes an appropriate sanc-
tion is left to the discretion of the trial judge.241 Moreover, the appellate
courts may increase the district court's award to include an additional
238. See Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985); Tedeschi v. Smith Bar-
ney, Harris Upman & Co., 757 F.2d 465, 466 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
147 (1986). In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986), the court outlined the
appropriate standard for review in a Rule 11 appeal. If the facts are disputed, the review is under
the "clearly erroneous" standard. If the legal conclusions are disputed, the review is de novo. "Fi-
nally, if the appropriateness of the sanction imposed is challenged, we review the sanction under
an abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 828.
239. See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
240. The Advisory Notes, supra note 75, at 200, state: "[I]n considering the nature and se-
verity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court should take account of the state of the attorney's
or party's actual or presumed knowledge when the pleading or other paper was signed." See also
Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986); Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. v. E.W.
Saybolt & Co., 112 F.R.D. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the ability to pay and the financial
status of the prevailing party also are relevant).
241. Invst Financial Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1987) (ruling that
determination of amount of award is discretionary and should take into account the Rule's goals of
deterrence and punishment).
A number of commentators and practitioners are disturbed by the lack of guidelines available
on which to base Rule 11 sanctions. See Grosberg, The Rule 11 Debate: Circuit Gives No Guid-
ance In Eastway, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 19, col.4.
In Eastway II, Judge Weinstein listed a number of factors to be considered. The factors are:
a) the cost of the Rule 11 violation to the party seeking sanctions, and
b) mitigating factors such as i) whether the client and lawyer believed they were correct in
taking the course they did; ii) whether there was vindictiveness or a desire to punish an oppo-
nent; iii) whether the lawyer is a neophyte who needs education, a repeat offender, or a person
standing at the bar whose actions have heretofore been ethical and in the high tradition of the
bar; iv) the ability to pay; v) the need for compensation; vi) the degree of frivolousness; and
vii) the dangers in chilling the particular kind of litigation involved.
637 F. Supp. at 571. The Second Circuit did not expressly adopt the factors on appeal; however,
the court did not disapprove of the factors. See Eastway III, 821 F.2d at 123.
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sanction for pursuing an unsuccessful appeal.242 The Rule requires only
that the sanction imposed by the court be reasonable.243 The determi-
nation of reasonableness should take into account various factors, in-
cluding the actual increased costs directly attributable to the
sanctioned behavior, the reasonableness of the fee claimed by the mo-
vant's attorney, the movant's duty to mitigate, and the sanctioned at-
torney's ability to pay.244
B. Significance of Attorney Sanctions
Many legal principles are geared toward allocating financial respon-
sibility to the person accountable and compensating the injured party.
Weighing against this policy is the American rule and its concern with
equal access to the judicial system. 45 Moreover, unless the attorney is
working on a contingency basis, attorneys generally collect their fees,
win or lose. The attorney is not required to bear the risk of a judgment
not being collected and may put a lien on the client's property or assets
to secure his fee.
Rule 11 provides that attorney's fees are assessable against either
the party or his attorney or both. 46 Sanctions directly against the attor-
ney will most effectively serve the Rule's goals of deterrence and pun-
ishment.2 47 Commentators argue that sanctioning the client for Rule 11
abuses is proper because the attorney serves merely as an advocate for
the client.248 The attorney fully informs the client of each tactical op-
tion and the potential consequences, allowing the client to select the
desired option. The attorney acts at the direction of the client, and the
client is, therefore, ultimately responsible.2 49 The attorney, however,
typically is in control of the entire litigation process and is most famil-
iar with the workings of the judicial system. The attorney's duty goes
beyond that to his client; it includes an ultimate duty to the legal sys-
242. Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 796 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1986).
243. Rule 11 speaks in terms of "reasonable expenses" and "reasonable attorney's fee." See
supra note 21.
244. Eastway III, 821 F.2d at 125 (Pratt, J. dissenting) (stating that examples of sanctions
include "requiring continuing legal education course work in areas of acute deficiency; in extreme
cases, recommending disciplinary action by the bar; or something as simple as a judicial repri-
mand, whether rendered in private, in open court, or in a published opinion"); In re Yagman, 796
F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986); Advo Sys., Inc. v. Walters, 110
F.R.D. 426, 431-33 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (ordering that in conjunction with Rule 11 sanctions, the
plaintiff and counsel split costs for "drain on judicial resources," calculated based on the time the
court spent trying the case).
245. See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
246. For the text of amended Rule 11, see supra note 21.
247. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Axelberg, supra note 101, at 99.
249. Id.
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tern as a whole.250 In most cases, sanctioning the attorney, at least par-
tially, will best serve the intent of Rule 11.
The predictability that will result from uniform sanctions imposed
directly on counsel will benefit the entire system. Allowing an attorney
to defend against Rule 11 sanctions by arguing that the client directed
his actions will be less beneficial. The drafters of the Rule were con-
cerned with satellite litigation, and these claims against clients will re-
sult in the worst type of spin-off litigation. The attorney and client
would be forced to obtain separate counsel to litigate the issue of re-
sponsibility for Rule 11 violations. In contrast, uniform assessment of
responsibility to the attorney will decrease such litigation and will best
serve the deterrence goal.
V. CONCLUSION
The number of Rule 11 motions has increased since the 1983
amendment; however, the concepts and deterrence principles of the
Rule are neither widely accepted nor generally effective throughout
most of the country.251 Approximately eighty percent of the sanctions
are levied by only five percent of the judges. Moreover, uniformity in
the scope and severity of the sanctions being awarded is seriously lack-
ing between districts. Opponents of strict, zealous imposition of Rule 11
sanctions reiterate the concerns expressed by adversaries of the original
implementation of the Rule. These opponents foresee the chilling of ad-
vocacy, increased costs of satellite litigation, and the development of a
less aggressive bar.252
These results are neither necessary nor intended. The primary ben-
efit from active application of Rule 11 is the deterrent effect. Because
only the increase in Rule 11 motions and the seemingly adverse effects
of a lengthened trial process or increased docket are subject to statisti-
cal measurement, foes of Rule 11 have what they consider to be strong
empirical data of the Rule's failure. The entire legal community, how-
250. Id. at 99-100.
251. The Second Circuit Judicial Conference on September 13, 1984 reported that since the
1983 amendments over 100 sanction applications had been filed, with four-fifths of those coming
under Rule 11. Of the over 100 applications, three-fourths were against the plaintiff and 50% had
been granted. Of the remaining one-fourth against the defendant, 70% were granted. However, the
geographic distribution of the applications was disproportionate with certain areas of the country,
creating "hot spots." Twenty-eight of the eighty-four Rule 11 motions were filed in Chicago. A
large number also were filed in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. "It looks as if in
the smaller districts, where the Bar is closer knit and better known to the judges, it isn't as com-
mon to apply for sanctions." Judicial Conference-Second Circuit, 106 F.R.D. 103, 183 (1984).
By August 1987 the courts had rendered more than 1000 decisions under the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11. Joseph, supra note 105, at 88.
252. Meeting of Section of Antitrust Law at the Annual Meeting for the American Bar Asso-
ciation, 55 U.S.L.W. 2120 (Aug. 26, 1986).
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ever, must keep in mind the obvious intent of the Rule as amended and
strengthened in 1983. The number of improper, sanctionable pleadings,
motions, or other papers that strict application of Rule 11 deters attor-
neys from filing cannot be easily measured. The reaction of the judicial
system will determine whether the Rule will become an integral part of
the system, as intended, or whether it will once again fall into a state of
disuse. Either reaction will send a message to attorneys. If judges refuse
to sanction violations or if attorneys refuse to move for sanctions when
a violation is apparent, those attorneys who are inclined to abuse the
system, even under the guise of zealous advocacy, will receive an une-
quivocal message that their behavior has been accepted. 253 The ultimate
goal of the Rule is to heighten the standards of the legal profession.254
Strict application by the courts of the strong sanctions provided by the
Rule will inform the legal profession that the system will no longer tol-
erate irresponsible lawsuits. The end result will be an improved judicial
system for the benefit of all.
Debbie A. Wilson
253. See Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. CICO, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 661 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
254. Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, supra note 95, at 54. "The real objective of the amend-
ments is not to handicap the ingenious nor even to punish the wicked but to elevate the standards
of practice." Id.
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